Protesting or Justifying? A Latent Class Model for Contingent Valuation with Attitudinal Data by Cunha-e-Sa, Maria Antonieta et al.
Protesting or Justifying?
A Latent Class Model for Contingent Valuation
with Attitudinal Data
Maria A. Cunha-e-S´ a,a∗ L´ ıvia Madureira,b
Luis C. Nunes,a Vladimir Otrachshenkoa
aUniversidade Nova de Lisboa,
Faculdade de Economia
bUniversidade de Tr´ as-os-Montes e Alto Douro,
Departamento de Economia, Sociologia e Gest˜ ao
March 25, 2010
∗Corresponding author: Maria A. Cunha-e-S´ a; Address: Faculdade de Economia, Univer-
sidade Nova de Lisboa, Campus de Campolide, 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal; Phone: (351)-
213801600; Email: mcunhasa@fe.unl.pt.
1Protesting or Justifying?




This article develops a latent class model for estimating willingness to pay for
public goods using simultaneously contingent valuation (CV) and attitudinal
data capturing protest attitudes related to the lack of trust in public institutions
providing those goods. A measure of the social cost associated with protest
responses and the consequent loss in potential contributions for providing the
public good is proposed. The presence of potential justiﬁcation biases is further
considered, that is, the possibility that for psychological reasons the response
to the CV question aﬀects the answers to the attitudinal questions. The results
from our empirical application suggest that psychological factors should not be
ignored in CV estimation for policy purposes, allowing for a correct identiﬁcation
of protest responses.
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1Stated preference (SP) survey techniques, such as the Contingent Valuation
(CV) approach, are widely used to elicit the economic value of public goods, as
land preservation, biodiversity, and other environmental amenities. Often, pub 
lic agencies rely on those estimates to decide about the adoption of alternative
policies. However, as pointed out by Carson and Groves [6], and Johnston and
Duke [12], the elicited willingness to pay (WTP) may be aﬀected by the policy
process through which the public good will be provided. In particular, in the
literature, the lack of trust in institutions is identiﬁed as one of the factors that
may contribute to the presence of protest responses, that is, when respondents
do not state their true value of the good in question (see Mitchell and Car 
son [20]). As a result, the use of standard SP methods without accounting for
protest responses will not be able to elicit the true economic value that would
allow for optimally providing the public good at stake, with a resulting cost to
society.
Often, the identiﬁcation of protestors relies on the answers to a set of atti 
tudinal questions posed to respondents that have stated a zero WTP or refused
to pay the proposed bids, as in Jorgensen, Syme, Bishop and Nancarrow [14],
Jakobsson and Dragun [11], among others. As an alternative, all respondents
can be asked to answer the attitudinal questions. In fact, as shown by Jor 
gensen and Syme [13], Dziegielewska and Mendelsohn [7], and Meyerhoﬀ and
Liebe [18], [19], respondents that are willing to pay may also exhibit protest re 
sponses. One may use the responses to those attitudinal questions as indicators
that convey information about underlying protest attitudes, which may aﬀect
the respondents elicitation process. However, in all these cases, the identiﬁca 
tion of protestors is based on ad hoc criteria deﬁned by the researcher, implying
that respondents cannot be unambiguously identiﬁed as protesters.
In contrast, latent class models (LCM) can be used to endogenously identify
classes of individuals with similar characteristics, such as preferences or atti 
2tudes, according to their responses to survey questions.1 In the context of CV
studies, Bartczak, Liebe, and Meyerhoﬀ [1] use a LCM to identify classes of
protesters. The methodology followed by these authors only takes into account
the responses to the attitudinal questions when estimating the latent classes.
However, since the answers to the CV questions are directly aﬀected by a re 
spondent being a protestor or not, those answers could also be used to better
infer about class membership, which is not the case in their paper.
We contribute to this literature by developing a LCM for estimating WTP
using simultaneously CV and attitudinal data capturing protest attitudes. We
also account for the presence of potential justiﬁcation biases, that is, the pos 
sibility that for psychological reasons the response to the CV question aﬀects
the answers to the attitudinal questions, as suggested by Ben Akiva, Walker,
Bernardino, Gopinath, Morikawa, and Polydoropoulou [2]. This is diﬀerent from
all other studies, as to the best of our knowledge none has considered it before.
Our model is applied to a CV study regarding the preservation of the tradi 
tional landscape of the Douro Region, a recreation area in the north of Portugal,
which has been classiﬁed by UNESCO as World Cultural Heritage since 2001,
due to its unique natural and human environments. The estimation results
obtained support the existence of two classes of respondents in the sample,
identiﬁed as non protesters and protesters.
The diﬀerence between the estimated values of WTP in the two classes
captures the loss in potential contributions for providing the public good that
can be imputed to the perceived lack of trust in public institutions responsible
for environmental preservation. We propose using this diﬀerence as a measure of
the implicit social cost. Thus, our article also contributes to the recent literature
1Recent examples of empirical applications of LCM based on diﬀerent types of data are
given by Walker and Li [22] on household location decisions, and Morey, Thacher, and Breﬄe
[21], Breﬄe, Morey, and Thacher [5], and Bestard, Font, and Hicks [4] on recreational site
choice.
3that discusses the impact of the quality of institutions on the eﬃcient allocation
of public goods (for example, the respect and enforcement of contracts, the
eﬃcacy of the rule of law, and the extent of government corruption), as in
Bernauer and Koubi [3].
We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant justiﬁcation bias, that is, respondents bias their
answers to the attitudinal questions when attempting to justify a “Not Pay”
response to the CV question. It may be the case that a non protester does not
wish to look guilty in the eyes of other people for not aﬀording to pay or not
valuing the environment highly enough, and, subsequently, tries to justify his
negative CV response by looking like a protestor when answering the attitudinal
questions. If this justiﬁcation bias is ignored in the model, some non protester
respondents are wrongly classiﬁed as protesters, and vice versa, severely bias 
ing both the estimate of the social cost and the economic value of the public
good with implications for policy purposes. Therefore, we may conclude that
psychological factors should not be ignored in CV estimation.
The Model
We present a model that describes the responses to the CV question and to a
set of questions regarding protest attitudes. The responses to these attitudi 
nal questions are used as protest indicators containing useful information about
underlying unobserved attitudes toward protesting. We assume that the pop 
ulation can be divided into a ﬁnite number of classes C that diﬀer from each
other in terms of their protest attitudes, which in turn aﬀect the CV responses
and the protest indicators. Therefore, although individual class membership is
not directly observed, it can be inferred from the available data.
Figure 1 shows the general representation of the latent class model for WTP
and protest attitudes using simultaneously CV and attitudinal data. It is based
on the integrated choice and latent variable model proposed by Ben Akiva et
al. [2]. We present the particular case of two classes, denoted as protesters
4and non protesters, as in the case of our application. Observed variables appear
in rectangles while unobserved variables, such as WTP and the latent class
variable, appear in ovals. The dashed arrows from the latent class variable to
the protest indicators represent the measurement equations describing how the
probability distributions of the protest indicators vary across classes. The solid
lines represent the CV model. We also consider socio economic variables as
explanatory variables in the class membership equation and in the CV model.
Finally, the model allows for justiﬁcation bias, represented by the arrows that
link the response to the CV question to the protest indicators.
In the dichotomous choice CV question, respondents were asked whether
they would be willing to pay randomly assigned ﬁxed amounts in order to pre 
serve the environmental good, or prefer not to pay, in which case environmental
preservation would be kept at a lower level (status quo). To explain the re 
sponses to this question we follow the random WTP approach as described in
Haab and McConnell [10]. The WTP for an individual n belonging to a class c






where Zn is a k × 1 vector of explanatory variables that reﬂect individual 
speciﬁc socio economic characteristics, ϑ
c
n is a stochastic component capturing
other unobservable individual heterogeneity, and αc is a vector of parameters
speciﬁc to each class c = 1,...,C. Assuming a log linear model, we have that,






In the particular case of two classes, where one represents protesters and the
other non protesters, equation (2) would correspond to the true economic WTP
for the non protester class. For protesters, it would in general be diﬀerent from
5the WTP from utility maximization. In our application, we adopt the usual logit
model and assume that ϑ
c
n/σc follows a standard logistic distribution where σc is
a scale parameter aﬀecting the variance of the stochastic term in class c such that
the cumulative distribution function of z ≡ ϑ
c
n/σc is given by F(z)=ez/(1+ez).
It follows that an individual responds to the CV question with “Pay” or
“Not Pay” if his WTP is “larger” or “not larger” than the proposed bid amount,
respectively. Deﬁning un = 1 when the response is “Pay”, and un = 0 when it








where Bidn is the randomly proposed bid amount. Therefore, the probability
that an individual n belonging to class c chooses to pay is given by:







1 = αc/σc, and β
c
2 = −1/σc. The median WTP for an individual in







The responses to the p attitudinal questions are denoted by a p×1 vector In
= (In1,...,Inp)′ of protest indicators. These indicators are categorically ordered
variables, where responses are given on a Likert scale, taking values from 1 to
T, as follows. For any given protest indicator j = 1,...,p, we have that
Inj =

        




















j,k represents the threshold of switching from category k−1 to category
k when an individual belongs to class c, and I∗
nj represents in this case the
corresponding latent unobserved indicator. We denote by τc the vector of all
τc
j,k , j = 1,...,p, k = 1,...,T − 1.
6The latent protest indicators are assumed to depend on the class c, on the
explanatory variables Zn, and on the response to the CV question un, capturing
the justiﬁcation bias, according to the measurement equation:
I∗
n = ΘcZn + Ψc
nun + εc
n (6)
where Θc and Ψc are p × k and p × 1 vectors of parameters, respectively, for
class c, and εc
n is a p × 1 vector of error terms that follows some distribution
denoted as D(0,Σc
ε) with parameters Σc
ε, which may vary across classes. In our
application we assume a logistic distribution. In the questionnaire used in our
empirical application, as is common in related studies, the attitudinal questions
appear immediately after the CV question. If the order of the questions was
reversed, the nature of the justiﬁcation bias would also have to be changed and
the model modiﬁed accordingly.
From equations (5) and (6) we derive the probability of individual n re 
sponding In conditional on belonging to a particular class c, having character 
istics Zn, and having responded un to the CV question, which is denoted as
g(In|Zn,un,c).
Finally, we also allow class membership to depend on explanatory variables:





for c = 1,....,C. (7)
Equation (7) represents the probability that individual n belongs to class c given
his socio economic characteristics.
The joint probability of the responses to the CV and protest indicators,






1(un=i)P(un = i|Zn,Bidn,c)g(In|Zn,un,c)P(cn = c|Zn) (8)
7where 1( ) denotes the indicator function. The maximum likelihood estimator
























and N denotes the num 
ber of observations in the sample. The estimations were performed using the EM
algorithm (see Dempster, Laird, and Rubin [8]).2
Case Study
Our empirical application was based on a survey conducted in The Alto Douro
Wine Region, located to the east of the city of Oporto, in the north of Portugal.
The cultural landscape of the Alto Douro represents an outstanding example of
humankind’s unique relationship with the natural environment. The “Demar 
cated Douro Region”, deﬁned and regulated since 1756, is one of the oldest of
all the historic winemaking regions in the world, producing a world commod 
ity, Port Wine, famous for its quality around the globe. The building of its
landscape pattern by the wine producers, characterized by the land partition
and cultural diversity, was recognized as an exceptional testimony to a living
cultural tradition, and the Alto Douro Wine Region became part of UNESCO’s
World Heritage cultural landscape in 2001.
In the last three decades, there has been an enormous pressure to trans 
form the old vineyards into modern ones with the associated destruction of the
typical landscape, due to the need of increasing productivity. In this context,
we investigate the possibility of using tax revenues to ﬁnancially support the
winegrowers in the region to prevent the destruction of the landscape.3 How 
ever, the extent to which citizens trust public institutions responsible for the
implementation of this project is a crucial issue in this context.
2The code to implement the estimations is available from the authors upon request.
3This is a quasi-public good, because it is possible to exclude people from its use, by
charging a price to use the resource or making the agent spend money or time to use the
resource.
8Recent evidence shows that income per capita or its growth, as well as the
achievements in the areas of health, education, infrastructure, etc., are highly
correlated with measures of institutional quality, ranging between 0.65 and 0.78,
as mentioned in Gradstein [9]. A variety of institutional quality measures have
been developed. For example, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi [15] have con 
structed aggregate measures of governance for 209 countries and territories for
ﬁve recent years, including voice and accountability; political instability and
violence; government eﬀectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control
of corruption. In particular, in the index on Government Eﬀectiveness, the au 
thors “...combine responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality
of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the
civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on inputs required for
the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver
public goods.”4
In the case of Portugal, for the period considered (1996 2004), the index does
not show an improvement in the country’s relative position. On the contrary,
from 2002 to 2004, it shows a negative trend.5 In general, Portugal is closer
to the southern European countries than to the Nordic ones. Spain is typically
ahead of Portugal, while Portugal is ahead of Greece. In the last decade, the
persistence of a large budget deﬁcit has been responsible for a long period of
slow growth, below the EU average, making convergence more diﬃcult. Since
there is also recent evidence that shows a great deal of persistence in indicators
related to development, such as income, growth rates, and income inequality,
as well as with respect to institutional indicators, and given the performance of
the Portuguese economy in recent years, a reversal of the observed trend is not
4See Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi [15], pg. 130.
5See Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi [15], pg. 123.
9expected.
The Data
Information was collected in the summer of 2006 through face to face interviews
of a random sample of visitors to the Alto Douro Wine region. Interviewers
followed a worded script to avoid leading eﬀects. The questionnaire included a
CV question to measure the WTP for landscape preservation. The CV question
format chosen was the referendum dichotomous choice. Each respondent was
asked a CV question for an improvement in the level of preservation where the
status quo was the case of no preservation, and the bids varied randomly among
the respondents. The payment mechanism that was proposed to respondents
was an annual payment that would be collected in addition to the annual income
tax. The money raised would go to a public institution that would compensate
winegrowers for the incurred costs to keep the traditional landscape.
Moreover, attitudinal questions were also included in the survey immediately
following the CV question, and all respondents were asked to answer them.
These questions, presented in the Appendix, are similar to those used in other
studies investigating protest responses (see Jorgensen et al. [14] and Jorgensen
and Syme [13]) and include not only the standard motivations for protesting,
but also other reasons for paying (attitudes toward the environment) or not
paying (budget constraints). The answers were given on a ﬁve level Likert scale
(from 1 strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree).
The sample used in this article consists of 706 observations. Table 1 provides
descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the estimations.
Estimation Results
In Table 2, we present the results of an exploratory factor analysis of the re 
sponses to all attitudinal questions. The factor loadings for the ﬁrst three factors
are presented. The ﬁrst factor has high loads for questions 1, 2, 3, 6, and 9, all
of which concern mostly budget constraint issues. The ﬁve questions that have
10a factor loading larger than 0.5 for the second factor are questions 4, 5, 8, 10,
and 11. We interpret these questions as reﬂecting protest attitudes related to
the lack of trust in public institutions and their role in the provision of public
goods. The third factor is related to questions 12, 13, 14, and 15, which reﬂect
a positive valuation of environmental preservation.
Based on these results, we select the responses to the attitudinal questions
related to the second factor as protest indicators that will be used in our ap 
plication. The corresponding frequency distributions appear in Table 3. For all
protest indicators, the responses are mostly concentrated in the range 3 5 with
a mode of 4, meaning that most people were either indiﬀerent or agreed with
the statements.
Next, we present and discuss the estimation results for the model presented
above. In order to decide on the number of classes, we use the Lo Mendell 
Rubin (LMR) adjusted likelihood ratio test (see Lo, Mendell, and Rubin [16]),
a parametric bootstrap test (see McLachlan and Peel [17]), and other criteria
such as BIC, adjusted BIC, and AIC. The results support the existence of two
classes against one.6
Estimation results for the models with two classes appear in Table 4. While
Model 1J allows for justiﬁcation bias, Model 1 does not. This table is divided
into four sections. The ﬁrst corresponds to the CV equation (4), the second to
the justiﬁcation bias eﬀect in the measurement equation (6), and the third to
the class membership equation (7). Finally, the estimated median WTP and
the estimated proportion of individuals in each class, as well as other model ﬁt
6Some identiﬁcation problems aﬀected the estimated model with 3 classes which may in-
validate the corresponding likelihood ratio test (see Lo et al. [16] and McLachlan and Peel
[17]). Even after ﬁxing some of the parameters, standard errors could not be computed due
to a non-positive deﬁnite ﬁrst-order derivative product matrix. The reason for this is that
in this type of model with 3 or more classes, the number of parameters to estimate becomes
very large, and unless the sample is very large, there will always be a chance that some of
the intervals deﬁned in (5) have no observations. The likelihood ratio tests selected 3 classes
while the BIC selected 2 classes. Given the overparametrization of the model with 3 classes,
the preferred model was the one with only 2 classes.
11statistics are shown in the fourth part at the bottom of the table. According to
all model selection criteria, as presented in Table 4, and a likelihood ratio test,
Model 1J, allowing for justiﬁcation bias, is preferred. Moreover, the majority of
the coeﬃcients capturing this eﬀect are signiﬁcant in both classes.
We have also computed for each model the probability distributions of the
protest indicators for each class and, in the case of Model 1J, for each possible
response to the CV question. These are presented in Table 5. To facilitate the
reading of the results, for each protest indicator, the probabilities of indicating
levels 4 5 in the Likert scale for Models 1 and 1J are presented graphically in
Figures 2 and 3, respectively.
For both models, the two classes diﬀer with respect to the estimated coeﬃ 
cients in the CV model, as well as in the probability distributions of the protest
indicators. In addition, in Model 1J, there are also diﬀerences in the way the
response to the CV model impacts the protest indicators, that is, the two classes
diﬀer in terms of the justiﬁcation bias.
For Model 1, we may conclude from the results in Table 5 that the probability
distribution of the protest indicators for class 1 is shifted to the right relative
to class 2, meaning that respondents in the ﬁrst class have stronger attitudes
toward protesting. This is clear from Figure 2, where we observe that the
respondents of class 1 have a higher probability of indicating levels 4 and 5 in
the Likert scale for all protest indicators in comparison with those in class 2.
In Model 1J this conclusion also holds if we control for the response to the CV
question (see also Figure 3). Consequently, we interpret class 1 as representing
protesters and class 2 non protesters.
We also allow for the socio economic characteristics to aﬀect class member 
ship. In particular, age has a negative impact and employment condition has a
positive one. Therefore, younger people with a job have a higher probability of
belonging to the protester class.
12In Model 1J, the negative signs of the estimates of the coeﬃcients associated
with the answer to the CV in the measurement equation (see the second part
of Table 4) mean that responding “Pay” to the CV question has a negative
impact on the levels of the protest indicators in both classes. Therefore, we
can conclude that, in both classes, when a respondent answers negatively to
the CV question, that person tries to justify that response by positively biasing
his responses to the protest indicators. This eﬀect is clear from Figure 3. The
justiﬁcation bias can be regarded as an “attribution bias” due to psychological
reasons.7 For instance, it may be the case that a non protester does not wish
to look guilty in the eyes of other people for not aﬀording to pay or not valuing
the environment highly enough, and, subsequently, tries to justify his negative
CV response by giving higher values to the protest indicators, that is, he tries
to look like a protester although it is not the case.
Regarding the CV part of the model, the estimated coeﬃcients of ln(Bid)
are signiﬁcant and have the expected negative sign in both models, 1 and 1J.
We also sought to include other explanatory variables but none were signiﬁcant.
The median WTP is computed for each class. We conclude from Model 1J (see
Table 4) that the WTP is greater for the non protester class, 13.4 euros, than
for the protester class, 8 euros.8 The diﬀerence between the two values, 5.4
euros, captures the loss in potential contributions to support the provision of
the local public good in the Douro region due to the presence of protesters,
which corresponds to about 25% of the individuals in the sample (see Table 4).
Thus, if this sample was representative of the population, the estimated loss
of 5.4 euros for about a quarter of the population could be taken as a lower
bound to the social cost of having institutions that are ineﬃcient at providing
7In Psychology, an “attributional bias” is a cognitive bias that aﬀects the way an individual
determines who or what was responsible for an event or action (attribution).
8For a simple logit model with just one class, the corresponding estimated median WTP
is approximately 10 euros, which falls between those values, as expected.
13this local public good, as perceived by the population.9 Note that the estimated
social cost is computed as a diﬀerence between two classes, and it is possible
that respondents in class 2, with a weaker attitude toward protesting relative
to class 1, also exhibit protest responses such that the measure of WTP in this
class may be undervalued. Ultimately, the optimal decision on the provision of
the local public good at stake should be supported by a cost beneﬁt analysis
that would ideally also take into account the costs incurred by wine producers
to maintain the traditional landscape.
Finally, we observe that, if no justiﬁcation bias is allowed for as in Model 1,
the estimated median WTP for the non protestor class becomes higher (17.8 vs
13.4 euros) and lower for the protester class (6.4 vs 8 euros), implying that the
diﬀerence between the WTP in the two classes becomes much larger (11.4 vs
5.4 euros). Intuitively, this discrepancy is caused by the fact that in this model
some individuals are wrongly classiﬁed as protesters because they are “inﬂating”
their responses to the attitudinal questions while attempting to justify a “Not
Pay” response to the CV question. Therefore, in the preferred model, Model 1J,
for those respondents who chose not to pay, the probability of being classiﬁed
as a protester is reduced relative to Model 1, which does not allow for the
justiﬁcation bias. Hence, in Model 1J, these individuals can be reclassiﬁed as
non protesters. As a result, more people who responded “Not Pay” end up in
the non protester class, and vice-versa for those who have responded “Pay”,
so that we end up with more payers in the protester class and non payers in
the non protester class. Thus, we conclude that, if justiﬁcation bias was not
considered, it would lead to an overestimation of both the economic value of the
public good and the social cost of the perceived ineﬃciency of public institutions
in providing that good.
9In general, in order to obtain an aggregate estimate of the cost for society, heterogeneity
in the population should be taken into account.
14Conclusions
In this article, we develop a latent class model for estimating WTP for public
goods using simultaneously CV and attitudinal data capturing protest attitudes
related to the lack of trust in public institutions providing those goods. Based
on a CV study conducted in The Alto Douro Wine Region, located in the
north of Portugal, two classes of respondents are identiﬁed, protestors and non 
protestors, and its impact on the estimated WTP is examined.
We propose a measure of the social cost associated with the lack of perceived
credibility of public institutions responsible for the provision of the public good,
by computing the diﬀerence between the WTP estimates in the two classes. Such
a measure may be important for policy purposes, as it provides an estimate of
the loss in potential contributions to support the provision of the local public
good. Moreover, we allow for the possibility of a justiﬁcation bias, that is,
the potential impact of the response to the CV question on the answers to
the attitudinal questions. We show that omitting this justiﬁcation bias would
overestimate the economic value of the public good and more than double the
estimate of the social cost related to the mistrust in public institutions, with
important policy implications. Therefore, psychological factors should not be
disregarded in CV estimation, allowing for a correct identiﬁcation of protest
responses.
Our methodology is ﬂexible enough, and can be applied to other cases where
mistrust of institutions or other sources of ineﬃciency may have an impact on
the provision of public goods. Moreover, it is possible to extend the latent class
model by incorporating additional latent variables to capture diﬀerent types of
attitudes. This is left for further research.
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Q1. The values are too high 
Q2.  I can’t afford to pay anything right now 
Q3. The landscape preservation is not my problem 
Q4. The landscape should be preserved with the current taxes 
Q5.  I think the money will be used for other purposes 
Q6.  The residents of the region should pay for this preservation 
Q7.  The local authorities and tourist operators should pay for this preservation 
Q8.   It is not fair to ask me to pay 
Q9.   I would rather pay for more important things 
Q10. This payment will not insure the preservation of the landscape 
Q11. I already pay enough taxes for this preservation 
Q12. It is necessary to pay to visit and benefit from this region more often 
Q13. It is necessary to pay to insure the preservation of this landscape because it is                                                                                                                                                                                                  
unique 
Q14. It is necessary to pay to insure the preservation of this landscape because it is 
beautiful 




Likert Scale used: 
 
1-  strongly disagree 
2-  disagree 
3-  neither agree nor disagree 
4-  agree 



















Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variable     Mean    SD     Min  Max                                Description  
 
CV Response  0.32       0.47        0         1       Response to the CV question (1=Pay, 0=Not Pay) 
 
Bid                  46.7       29.7      10       100      Bid for the CV question in Euros             
 
Age                 45.3       13.7      18         85      Age of the respondent 
 




Table 2: Factor Loadings from an exploratory factor analysis of the responses to the 
attitudinal questions 
 
Factors  Attitudinal 
Questions   1
st   2
nd   3
rd  
Q1  0.344  0.161  -0.079 
Q2  0.713  -0.004  0.09 
Q3  0.554  0.192  0.006 
Q4  -0.261  0.506  -0.011 
Q5  0.014  0.669  0.044 
Q6  0.432  -0.052  0.181 
Q7  -0.09  0.184  0.044 
Q8  0.182  0.631  -0.044 
Q9  0.342  0.187  -0.152 
Q10  0.005  0.777  0.019 
Q11  -0.045  0.74  0.072 
Q12  0.006  0.027  0.933 
Q13  -0.008  -0.02  0.962 
Q14  0.016  0.012  0.974 
Q15  -0.008  -0.012  0.962 
 
 
Table 3: Distribution of responses to the attitudinal questions (in %). 
 
Likert Scale  Attitudinal 
Questions  1  2  3  4  5 
Q4  0.4  3.8  7.1  60.9  27.8 
Q5  1.1  10.8  28.9  41.5  17.7 
Q8  1.4  15.4  15.6  52.1  15.4 
Q10  0.6  12.5  31.6  38.2  17.1 






Table 4: Estimation Results 
 
Model  1  Model  1 J 
LCM without Justification Bias  LCM with Justification Bias 
 
Class 1  Class 2  Class 1  Class 2 
Dependent Variable: CV Response          
















Independent Variable: CV Response         




















Dependent Variable: Classes         
























Median WTP  6.4  17.8  8.0  13.4 
Number of observation per class*   181  525  172  534 
Probability*  0.26  0.74  0.24  0.76 
Entropy  0.859  0.865 
AIC  8639  8462 
BIC  8853  8722 
Adjusted BIC  8704  8541 
Log-likelihood  -4272  -4174 
Number of parameters  47  57 
Number of observations  706  706 
Parametric bootstrapped LRT test  (0.00)  (0.00) 
LMR adjusted LRT test  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
Notes: p-values appear in parentheses. WTP is in Euros. 
 
*The number of observations per class and corresponding probabilities are based on the individual 














Table 5: Estimated conditional probabilities of responses to the attitudinal questions      
(in %) 
 
    Model  1  Model  1 J  
    Class 1  Class 2 
 
Class 1 
 Not Pay          Pay 
Class 2 
Not Pay          Pay 
Q4  Pr(Q4=1|Class)  1.6  0  1.4  3  0  0 
  Pr(Q4=2|Class)  0  5.2  0.5  1  4.2  6.0 
  Pr(Q4=3|Class)  0.4  9.5  0.9  1.8  8.0  10.8 
  Pr(Q4=4|Class)  26.1  73.7  18.9  31.5  74.5  73.7 
  Pr(Q4=5|Class)  71.9  11.5  78.4  62.7  13.3  9.5 
Q5  Pr(Q5=1|Class)  2.1  0.8  2.0  3.9  0.4  0.8 
  Pr(Q5=2|Class)  0.2  14.7  0  0  9.5  22.6 
  Pr(Q5=3|Class)  10.7  35.6  8.8  15.3  30.9  42.4 
  Pr(Q5=4|Class)  35  43.9  30.7  39  52.5  31.3 
  Pr(Q5=5|Class)  52  5.1  58.5  41.7  6.8  2.5 
Q8  Pr(Q8=1|Class)  2.4  1  2.0  8.6  0.3  1.5 
  Pr(Q8=2|Class)  2  20.4  3.1  11.6  10.2  34.2 
  Pr(Q8=3|Class)  3.4  20.1  2.9  8.8  15.3  26.4 
  Pr(Q8=4|Class)  46.2  54.3  41.5  53.2  66.1  36.1 
  Pr(Q8=5|Class)  45.9  4.2  50.5  17.8  8  1.8 
Q10  Pr(Q10=1|Class)  0.5  0.6  0.4  1.5  0.3  1.3 
  Pr(Q10=2|Class)  1.8  16.4  1.4  5.8  9.6  26 
  Pr(Q10=3|Class)  5.4  41.2  2.9  10.6  36.5  47.4 
  Pr(Q10=4|Class)  33  40.2  24.8  47.3  51.3  24.9 
  Pr(Q10=5|Class)  59.3  1.6  70.6  34.8  2.3  0.7 
Q11  Pr(Q11=1|Class)  1  0.6  0.9  2.1  0.3  0.6 
  Pr(Q11=2|Class)  0  7.4  0.7  1.6  3.5  12.6 
  Pr(Q11=3|Class)  1.2  16.4  1.8  3.9  9.9  25.4 
  Pr(Q11=4|Class)  19  67.4  12.6  23.1  73.7  57.4 






















   
 
 















variables  Latent Class 
(Protester/Non-
Protester) 
Protest Indicator 1  
 
Protest Indicator 2 







































Figure 2. Probability of indicating levels 4-5 for the protest indicators in Model 1 
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Figure 3. Probability of indicating levels 4-5 for the protest indicators in Model 1J 
(with justification bias) 
 